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NO FREEDOM FROM RELIGION:
THE MARGINALIZATION OF ATHEISTS IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY, POLITICS, AND LAW
JENNIFER GRESOCK*
On August 27, 1988, reporter Robert I. Sherman of the
American Atheist Press approached Republican presidential nominee
George Bush with a simple question: what would he do to win the
votes of atheists?' When Bush skirted the question and Sherman
pressed him, the nominee offered an astounding response. Bush said
that he did not "know that atheists should be considered as citizens,
nor should they be considered patriots. This is one nation under
God."2  While such a comment may seem quite extraordinary in a
country that purports to value religious freedom and diversity, it
probably surprised few atheists. Most atheists are accustomed to being
misunderstood or treated with hostility and disdain. In an article on
"coming out" as an atheist, Dave Silverman notes, "[A]theists are
vilified as anarchistic and evil anti-religionists."3
In a society that obsesses about class, gender, and racial
categorizations, it is easy to forget that other, less visible groups suffer
the painful effects of oppression. Because the damaging effects of
racism, classism, and sex discrimination are so extreme, society tends
to dismiss other forms of oppression that appear to be less severe. But
if, as a society, we truly hope to achieve "liberty, and justice for all,"4
we must acknowledge and combat all forms of oppression. This
includes not only the most egregious kinds of oppression, but also
oppression that touches only a relative few. Atheists, who suffer from
that of the latter category, make up only four to ten percent of the
American population.
5
* J.D. 2001, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. FREE INQUIRY, Fall 1988, at 16 available at
http://www.amicron.com/users/dhaas/misc/george-bush.htm.
2. Id.
3. Dave Silverman, Coming Out-Atheism: The Other Closet, at
http://www.atheists.org/comingout/othercloset.html.
4. These words are, of course, taken from the U.S. "Pledge of Allegiance." It may
seem to be a curious reference to use here because of its overt reference to God; however, the
original pledge did not contain the words "under God." Professor Steven Epstein notes that it
was "not until June 1954, at the height of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, that this
reference to God was added." Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of
Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2118 (1996).
5. Statistics on the number of atheists conflict. Some estimate that 94% of people
believe in God. Michael M. Maddigan, The Establishment Clause, Civil Religion, and the
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This paper will examine the social, political, and legal
ramifications of being an atheist in modem American society. Section
I offers a definition of atheism and an argument that atheists suffer a
form of cultural imperialism that constitutes oppression. Section II
illustrates how this cultural imperialism is reflected in our social and
political institutions. Section III presents an analysis of the legal
tradition that embodies and reinforces cultural imperialism, with a
particular emphasis on ceremonial deism. By casting certain religious
practices as mere ceremonial deism, courts have avoided subjecting
these practices to appropriately rigorous legal analysis under the
Establishment Clause. Ceremonial deism thus perpetuates the
alienation and marginalization of nonbelievers.
I. DEFINING ATHEISM AND THE CULTURAL IMPERIALISM OF
BELIEVERS
Defining atheism is perhaps not quite as straightforward as it
may seem. Indeed, in The Apology of Socrates, Plato notes that
Socrates was charged not only with teaching the youth to worship the
wrong gods, but also-paradoxically-with being an atheist.6
Atheism literally means "without theism," or "without belief in a god
or gods."' 7  The Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary's first
definition of atheism, which it acknowledges as archaic, is
"ungodliness; wickedness." 8  The Microsoft Reference Dictionary9
defines atheism first as a disbelief in or denial of the existence of God
or gods or the doctrine that there is no God or gods. The second
definition is particularly telling, if predictable: "Godlessness;
immorality."'
Public Church, 81 CALIF. L. REv., 293, 294 (1993). Others argue that the percentage is
higher. The American Atheists place the number of atheists much higher, at 10% of the
nation's population, or 26 million people. See the testimony of Ellen Johnson, President of
American Atheists, given to U.S. Civil Rights Commission on August 21, 1998, at
http://www.atheists.org/schoolhouse/seattle.html. Silverman writes that because only a few
atheists are willing to be open about their nonbelief, atheists are viewed as a much smaller
percentage of the population than they really are. Silverman, supra note 3.
6. Plato, The Apology of Socrates, in NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF WORLD MASTERPIECES,
807, 813 (Maynard Mack et al. eds., 1992).
7. See The Atheism Web: Definitions of Atheism, at
http://www.infidels.org/news/atheism/sn-definitions.html (last modified June 30, 1997).
8. MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 72 (10th ed. 1993).
9. MICROSOFT REFERENCE DICTIONARY CD-ROM (Microsoft, 1995).
10. Id.
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The pejorative bias in these dictionary definitions is clear
when they are compared with atheists' own definition of themselves.
Self-definitions are without the negative connotations of definitions
shaped by the cultural dominance of believers.I In a landmark case
challenging the constitutionality of prayer in public schools, the court
heard the following self-definition:
Your petitioners are Atheists, and they define their
lifestyle as follows. An atheist loves himself and his
fellow man instead of a god. An Atheist accepts that
heaven is something for which we should work now-
here on earth-for all men together to enjoy. An
Atheist accepts that he can get no help through prayer,
but that he must find in himself the inner conviction and
strength to meet life, to grapple with it, to subdue it and
to enjoy it. An Atheist accepts that only in a knowledge
of himself and a knowledge of his fellow man can he
find the understanding that will help to a life of
fulfillment.
12
Many atheists take great pride in their atheism. Silverman
writes, "one of the best components of atheism is the freedom of
thought and mind."'13 Silverman notes that among atheists, "prejudice
against people of other sexes, races, or sexual preferences is rare,
because most of such prejudice is religion-based."' 14  Bertrand
Russell-author, professor, and atheist-muses that while the
"freethinker's universe" may seem "bleak and cold" to others, to those
who have "grown accustomed to it, it has its own sublimity, and
confers its own joys."'15  Russell asserts that in "learning to think
freely, [freethinkers] have learnt to thrust fear out of our thoughts,"
11. The irony of terming oneself an atheist--"without theism"-is not lost on most
atheists. There is surely something paradoxical about defining yourself primarily by
describing what you are not. However, in a culture heavily dominated by believers, I find that
other terms fail to effectively counter the assumption that I am a believer. Thus, while I
privately define myself as an existential absurdist, I will almost always describe myself as an
atheist when communicating with others.
12. This quote appears on the American Atheists web site at http://www.atheists.org.
The site notes that this is the quotation that "began" the case. The case is Murray v. Curlett,
232 Md. 368 (1963).
13. Silverman, supra note 3.
14. Id.
15. BERTRAND RUSSELL, The Value of Free Thought: How to Become a Truth-Seeker
and Break the Chains of Mental Slavery, in THE ATHEIST VIEWPOINT 24 (1944).
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bringing "a kind of peace which is impossible to the slave of hesitant
and uncertain credulity."
16
Estimating the number of atheists in the United States is
difficult. American Atheists estimate that there may be 25 to 26
million atheists in this country.' 7 However, many atheists hide their
nonbelief from others due to "fear of hostility and aversion to
confrontation. ' 8 While determining the precise number of atheists
may be difficult, it is clear that the United States is dominated by
believers, including Jews, Muslims, and Christians, among others.
Atheist author Wendy Kaminer notes, "almost all Americans (95
percent) profess a belief in God or some universal spirit, according to a
1994 survey by U.S. News and World Report. Seventy-six percent
imagine God as a heavenly father who actually pays attention to their
prayers."1
9
Because believers are the majority, they wield tremendous
social, political, and legal power. It is easy for believers to ignore the
voices of the small minority of atheists. Indeed, some believers seem
entirely unaware that atheists even exist.20  Other believers explicitly
assert that because atheists are such a small minority, their rights
somehow count less than those of the majority. 2' Through cultural
16. Id.
17. Silvermanj supra note 3.
18. Id.
19. Wendy Kaminer, The Last Taboo: Why America Needs Atheism, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, October 14, 1996, at 24, available at
http://www.positiveatheism.org/writ/kaminer.htm.
20. Consider the following remark from a man interviewed about the current state of the
United States in a BALTIMORE SUN series called "Listening to the New America": "'We need
to turn this country around,' said Eddie Daigle, bathed in a soft glow from the track lighting
above, easy jazz floating into his ears, 'back to a Christian country. We need to put God back
in this country."' The comment indicates a complete disregard for or lack of awareness of all
non-Christians. Jonathan Weisman, Rising Tides in the Old South, BALT. SUN, July 17, 2000,
at Al.
21. An example of this reasoning can be found on the web site for Concerned Women
for America in an article on school prayer. Concerned Women for America claims to be the
nation's largest public policy women's organization, with over 500,000 members. The article,
by Laurel MacLeod, is entitled "School Prayer and Religious Liberty: A Constitutional
Perspective." MacLeod notes that the "most prevalent argument of such individuals is that the
government has a responsibility to be neutral, so that no child is offended by the religious
speech of another. This is erroneous because the issue cannot be neutral. Elimination of
religious expression for the atheist will offend the child who believes in God. So, the schools
must choose. Since 1962, they have sided with the small, nonreligious minority of atheists
which, as recent Newsweek poll shows, consists of only 4 percent of the population. By
contrast, 94 percent of respondents to that same survey professed a religious faith, and 61
percent said that they agreed with the statement that 'religion is very important' in their lives."
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imperialism, these believers impose a distinct form of oppression upon
atheists.
22
Iris Marion Young defines cultural imperialism as "the
experience of existing in a society whose dominant meanings render
the particular perspectives and point of view of one's own group
invisible at the same time as they stereotype one's group and mark it
out as 'other.' ' 23  Young asserts that cultural imperialism is the
"universalization of one group's experience and culture and its
establishment as the norm.... [T]he dominant groups project their own
experience as representative of humanity.... 24  Because believers
constitute the majority of the population, they easily dominate
nonbelievers, suffocating their voices with a powerful exertion of
cultural imperialism.
II. THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL MANIFESTATION OF CULTURAL
IMPERIALISM
As the above quotation illustrates, Young notes that an
oppressed group is made invisible through the mechanism of cultural
imperialism. Atheists are rendered invisible in part by the assumptions
and the expectations that believers impose upon them. Believers tend
to assume that other people must also be believers. This assumption is
usually correct because the majority of the population is indeed
comprised of believers. But for an atheist, the believers' assumption
can lead to discomfort, embarrassment, and a sense that the atheist is
living in a community that is defined by the expectations of others,
with little room for divergent viewpoints.
The atheists' situation is perhaps best compared to that of gays
and lesbians. Unlike racial minorities and women, the atheist does not
fear that discrimination or hostile treatment is the direct result of
physically apparent characteristics. But like members of the gay
community, the atheist may be careful not to reveal too much about his
Laurel MacLeod, School Prayer and Religious Liberty: A Constitutional Perspective, at
http://cwfa.org/library/freedom/2000-09-pp-school-prayer.shtml.
22. Atheism is distinct from agnosticism, which asserts that the existence or non-
existence of a god or gods is beyond human knowledge, and is thus unknowable. While
agnostics must deal with many of the same acts of cultural imperialism by the dominant
believers, this paper's focus is on atheists, for whom the oppression is a greater affront
because it is in conflict with atheism.
23. Iris Marion Young, Five Faces of Oppression, in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW: A
CIVIL RIGHTS READER 66, 77 (Leslie Bender & Daan Braveman, eds., 1995).
24. Id.
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or her "true self' for fear of condemnation or alienation. Silverman
acknowledges that "for some people, coming out as an atheist can be
as difficult as anything they've ever done."2  Kaminer notes some of
the dangers about being openly atheist:
... I'd violate the norms of civility and religious
correctness. I'd be excoriated as an example of the
cynical, liberal elite responsible for America's moral
decline. I'd be pitied for my spiritual blindness; some
people would try to enlighten and convert me. I'd
receive hate mail. Atheists generate about as much
sympathy as pedophiles.26
Consistent with Young's description of cultural imperialism,
believers also universalize their own experiences, effectively
marginalizing nonbelievers. Those holidays most important to
Christian believers are national holidays. Our currency and coins
proclaim "In God We Trust"-our national motto. 27  Our Pledge of
Allegiance was amended in the 1950s to include a reference to God as
the nation was gripped by an anti-communist fervor.28
Among the most vivid and ongoing examples of this
marginalization is the relentless push for prayer in public schools.
Thus far, the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that explicit prayer
has no place in public schools, whether led by teachers or student
volunteers. 29  But social conservatives continue to insist that school
prayer is fundamental to the proper moral upbringing of children.
30
25. Silverman, supra note 3.
26. Kaminer, supra note 19.
27. Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2096 (1996).
28. Id. at2118.
29. The Court's most recent affirmation of this was in Santa Fe v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290
(2000) (the "football game prayer case"). See also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)
(holding that non-denominational prayer to be recited by each class in a New York public
school district was inconsistent with the Establishment Clause); Abington School District v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding that the establishment clause prohibits state laws and
practices requiring the recitation of Bible verses and the Lord's Prayer); Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38 (1985) (holding that an Alabama law authorizing schools to set aside one minute
at the start of each day for meditation or voluntary prayer violated the Establishment Clause).
30. On his official campaign web site Reform Party candidate Pat Buchanan promises to
"take back our public schools by passing a constitutional amendment to allow voluntary
prayer and to "reject 'multicultural' curricula that denigrate our history and teach our children
to identify themselves as hyphenated Americans rather than as citizens of one nation under
God." See http://www.buchananreform.com/library/default.asp?id= 118 (last visited Oct. 30,
2000). Concerned Women for America, which claims to the nation's largest public policy
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The official 2000 platform of the Republican National Committee
proclaims: "We will continue to work for the return of voluntary
school prayer to our schools . . . We strongly support voluntary
student-initiated prayer in school without governmental interference.
We strongly disagree with the Supreme Court's recent ruling [Santa
Fe v. Doe], backed by the [Clinton] administration, against student-
initiated prayer."
3
'
But the Republican National Committee is really referring to
student-led prayer, not independent, private, student-initiated prayer.
No Supreme Court decision has threatened the right of individual
students to engage in independent, non-disruptive prayer in school,
silently or aloud, by themselves or in groups.32 In Santa Fe v. Doe, the
Court determined only that student-led prayer violated the
Establishment Clause. 33 For atheists, the on-going battle for school
prayer represents a continuous assault on their right to a public school
education free of religious proselytizing. Ellen Johnson, president of
American Atheists, testified before the U.S. Civil Rights Commission
that "[o]ur public schools are considered not educational centers, but a
locus for 'culture war' battles waged by certain sectarian groups who
seek to introduce prayer, religious proselytizing or inappropriate
religious content into public school curricula ... and other extra-
curricular activities....
In recent years, the tactics of those fighting to "put God back in
schools" have become a bit more subtle but remain just as threatening
to nonbelievers. Curriculum-based character education programs have
become one back-door way of slipping the endorsement of religion
into public school classrooms. A good example is the character
education program law passed by Georgia legislators in 1999. 35 Under
§ 20-2-145 of the Official Code of Georgia, the Georgia State Board of
Education must develop a character education program for all grade
levels.36 The "character curriculum" must focus on certain specified
women's organization, advocates school prayer in response to the moral decline of the United
States. See generally http://www.cwfa.org.
31. See Republican Platform 2000, available at http://www.rnc.org/gopinfo/platform.
32. See Rob Osberg, School Prayer, in RELIGION AND AMERICAN LAW: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA, 447-453 (Paul Finkelman, ed., 2000) (discussing practices and policies related
to school prayer that have been struck down).
33. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
34. Ellen Johnson, Unconstitutional Religious Expression in the Public Schools, at
http://www.atheists.org/schoolhouse/seattle.html (testimony of Ellen Johnson, President of
American Atheists, before the U.S. Civil Rights Commission on August 21, 1998).
35. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-145 (2000).
36. Id.
5752001]
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traits, including courage, tolerance, generosity, punctuality,
cleanliness, and other such non-religious virtues.37 However, buried in
the lengthy list of traits is a requirement that public schools teach
"respect for the creator." 38
Under the Georgia law, each school district is to develop its
own plan for implementing the character education curriculum.
39
Lumpkin County Public Schools planned to display posters
proclaiming, "In God We Trust" and noting "the duty we owe to our
creator."40  However, the liberal advocacy group People for the
American Way Foundation contacted school officials and warned them
that the program was unconstitutional. The Department of Education
then requested a formal legal opinion from the Georgia Attorney
General Thurbert E. Baker.41
On December 28, 2000, Attorney General Baker released an
opinion concluding that the inclusion of "respect for the creator" and
"In God We Trust" in the state's character education program was not
a violation of the First Amendment. 42 Baker relied on the Lemon test
to determine that "neither state lawmakers nor education officials
intended to advance religion." 43  Amanda Seals, spokesperson for
State School Superintendent Linda Schrenko, advocated a particular
curriculum poster that included the motto "In God We Trust" pictured
with an American flag. In praising the poster, she noted that it did not
"say anything about taking kids to church or which creator, Christian,
Muslim, Buddhist or whatever.,
44
Despite the opinion of the Georgia Attorney General, it seems
clear that the Georgia character education program constitutes an
endorsement of a religious belief in a deity. As attorneys at People for
the American Way Foundation stated in their letter to Attorney
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 'Respect for Creator' Law Raises Legal Questions, CHATTANOOGA NEWS FREE
PRESS, July 24, 2000, available at http://www.cyi-stars.org/articles/RespectForCreator.htm.
41. See Press Release, People for the American Way, Georgia Attorney General Urged
to Find that Teaching Students to Have 'Respect for The Creator' Is Unconstitutional (August
22, 2000), available at http://www.pfaw.org/news/press/2000-08-22.206.phtml. I was a
summer intern at People for the American Way Foundation during the time that the
organization began working on this case. I provided research assistance and support to the
staff attorneys working on this case.
42. Phillip Taylor, Georgia Attorney General Approves 'Respect for Creator'
Curriculum, January 22, 2001, at
http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentlD = 12910.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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General Baker, teaching "respect for the creator" "assumes and
promotes the existence of a single 'creator,' an inherently religious
belief.... The Constitution prohibits the government from endorsing
such beliefs and teaching students that they should have them. It
would be difficult to imagine a greater violation of freedom of
conscience than the government's instructing children that they should
hold particular religious beliefs as a matter of good character."
45
And yet not all observers see such a blatant violation of
freedom of conscience in the Georgia character education program.
The tendency for believers to universalize their own beliefs, rendering
nonbelievers invisible, is all too evident in the comments of one
Georgia school principal, John Newman: "As far as my community, I
don't think I'll have a problem. I think the consensus is that all
[religions] have a creator. We plan to fully implement all these
,46 rva
character traits.... Newman's comments reveal a total disregard for
those students who do not believe in a creator. Clearly, Newman is
either unaware that such students exist or is oblivious to the threat to
these students' freedom of conscience that the character education
program represents.
The terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, has fueled the
relentless efforts of some conservatives to marginalize atheists. In the
shock and grief that followed the murder of thousands of innocent
American civilians, many turned to worship and prayer, and the
drumbeat for school prayer has grown ever louder. American Atheists
note that in the aftermath of the attack,
there have been denunciations against those who
profess no religion, juxtaposed with calls to bring the
nation "back to god," even if it means reviving
unconstitutional practices like school prayer.... Clergy
are leading assemblies of students in prayer, and in
some communities, there is a renewed effort to post the
Ten Commandments, or open government meetings
with religious devotionals.47
45. Letter from People for the American Way Foundation and law firm of Bondurant,
Mixson & Elmore to Georgia Attorney General Thurbert E. Baker (August 22, 2000),
available at http://www.pfaw.org/news/press/letter.pdf.
46. 'Respect for Creator' Law Raises Legal Questions, supra note 40.
47. American Atheists, Inc., Attacks on Atheists, More "Crisis" Violations of First
Amendment, October 4, 2001, at http://www.atheists.org/flash.line/atheist2.htm.
2001]
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Indeed, the Washington Times claims that "God has made a
comeback," and notes that "[d]espite Supreme Court guidelines that
say mandatory prayer cannot be conducted at public schools, some
students, teachers and administrators around the nation have
momentarily bypassed constitutional concerns, praying openly at
assemblies, in classrooms and at sporting events, asking God for
support and protection. ' 48 Barry Lynn of the Americans United for
Separation of Church and State expressed concern about the trend,
saying that "some schools are considering patriotism and religion the
same thing, acting as if you cannot be patriotic unless you are also
conventionally religious.... That is a major fallacy."49 But the desire
to impose conventional religion persists; former California
Representative William F. Dannemeyer, head of Americans for
Voluntary School Prayer, supports a constitutional amendment to
establish prayer in schools. He argues that the issue is not really
school prayer, but rather "whether we as a people believe that God
exists."
In addition to suffering marginalization from those who fail to
recognize that they exist, atheists are further marginalized by their
explicit exclusion from popular organizations like the Boy Scouts of
America (BSA). Many American men point to their experience in Cub
Scouts and Boy Scouts as playing a powerful role in shaping them
both as citizens and as leaders. More than half of the members of the
106 th Congress were Boy Scouts. 51 And yet while the organization
proudly proclaims that it welcomes boys of all religions, it excludes
atheists from participation.52 Well before James Dale challenged the
Boy Scouts for excluding him because he was openly gay, several
atheists took legal action against the Boy Scouts when they were
refused membership in the organization."
In September 1989, eight-year-old Mark Welsh received a flyer
in school that stated, "Join Tiger Cubs, BSA and Have Lots of Fun!
48. Andrea Billups, Students Pray at School Events, WASH. TIMES, October 8, 2001, at
A13.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See the official web site of the Boy Scouts of America at
http://www.bsa.scouting.org.
52. It may be that some organizations enforce the exclusion of nonbelievers while others
do not. Because the Boy Scouts of America is made up of many small local chapters, or
"troops," the application requirements may be more stringent for some groups than for others.
53. In 1992, Mark Welsh and his son Elliot filed suit against the BSA. Welsh v. Boy
Scouts of America, 787 F.Supp. 1511 (N.D. Ill., 1992). And in 1993, Robert Sherman and his
son Robert Jr. filed suit against the BSA. 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2617, (N.D.III, 1993).
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You Can Join Tiger Cubs, BSA, If You Are In the First Grade." The
flyer also contained an invitation to an informational meeting. 54 Mark
and his father, Elliott, attended that meeting and learned that
"applications to join BSA required the applicants to agree and
recognize an obligation to God., 55 Child applicants were (and are)
required to subscribe to the Cub Scout Promise, while adult partners
were required to sign the Declaration of Religious Principle. Both
Elliott and Mark are atheists. But Elliott still wanted Mark to
participate in the organization because of the non-religious values
associated with scouting, as well as the fun Mark would have. 57 After
the meeting, Elliott mailed applications for his son and for himself.
58
On the applications, he noted that he and Mark subscribed to all but
the duty to God. 9 Their applications were rejected.6 °
The Welshes challenged their exclusion from the Boy Scouts
under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which bars
discrimination in places of public accommodation. 61 The trial court
determined that because the Boy Scouts were a private organization
rather than a place of public accommodation, they were not subject to
Title II's prohibition against discrimination. 62 Upon appeal, the 7 th
Circuit affirmed.63 What is remarkable about the opinions of both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals is the bland, sterile way that they
went about analyzing the issue. Both courts seemed entirely unmoved
by the exclusion of Mr. Welsh and his young son from the Boy Scouts.
It is not the Boy Scouts' legal victory in excluding atheists that
makes the Welsh case evidence of the marginalization of nonbelievers;
rather, it is the fact that such an exclusionary Boy Scout policy exists
in the first place. Nonbelievers are completely shut out of the
organization, though most people do not perceive it as primarily a
religious organization. Despite the Boy Scouts' public image as an
inclusive social organization that welcomes boys of all "ethnic,
religious, and economic backgrounds," 64 the Boy Scouts categorically
54. Welsh v. BSA, 787 F.Supp., 1511, 1517 (N.D.I1I., 1992).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1511.
62. Id. at 1538.
63. Welsh v. BSA, 993 F.2d 1267, 1268 (7th Cir. 1993).
64. See generally http://www.bsa.scouting.org.
2001]
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refuse to admit those who refuse to profess belief in a god.65 For a
young boy whose friends are enthusiastic members of the organization,
such discrimination is surely a source of confusion and alienation.
If Mark Welsh was a member of a racial minority and was
refused admission because of the color of his skin, it is difficult to
imagine that the courts would have offered such a tepid response.
66
One might argue that such a scenario could be distinguished since
religious belief is a basic tenet of the organization, while white
supremacy is not. Indeed, the dissenting Supreme Court justices in
BSA v. Dale made an analogous argument. 67 Noting that it was never
the official BSA policy to exclude gays before James Dale's
membership was revoked, the dissenters argued that the termination of
his membership constituted discrimination that violated the state's
anti-discrimination statute.
68
But what if white supremacy were the official policy of the
Boy Scouts, just as the majority in Dale concluded that the
organization had an official policy of excluding gays and lesbians?
The courts probably would not have limited the reach of Title II in the
face of blatantly racist policies. In fact, courts have held that Young
Men's Christian Associations that discriminated against blacks were
within the reach of Title II of the Civil Rights Act. 6 9 YMCA did not
65. Id.
66. Many atheists bristle at efforts to characterize atheism as a religion, and accordingly,
resist classifying themselves as a religious minority. This is primarily because atheists don't
perceive the absence of belief as being doctrinal, but merely logical and materialistic. As an
illustration, consider that most people do not believe in the existence of pink unicorns, and yet
they would hardly perceive this lack of belief to be part of their religion. Indeed, defining
atheism as a religion smacks of cultural imperialism, for it makes a religion of a rejection of
the beliefs of the majority.
67. BSA v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
68. Id.
69. See Smith v. Young Men's Christian Association of Montgomery, Inc., 462 F.2d
634, 636 (5th Cir. 1972) and Nesmith v. Young Men's Christian Association of Raleigh, N.C.,
397 F.2d 96, 99-100 (4th Cir. 1968). In Welsh v. BSA, the 7th Circuit makes much of the fact
that the YMCA decisions were based in part on the organization's ownership of recreational
facilities, while the Boy Scouts are not associated with any particular place. However, as 7th
Circuit Court Judge Cummings explained in his dissenting opinion, there is no "principled
distinction between membership organizations such as the Boy Scouts that meet in varying
locales and other organizations that use or own one facility... .That Title II should turn on the
definition of 'place' is irrational because places do not discriminate; people who own and
operate places do. And there is no basis to believe that those who operate facilities at fixed
locales, as opposed to those who operate membership organizations from various locales, are
more deserving of civil rights regulation....The more logical and contextual reading of Title II
is that 'place' is a mere 'term of convenience, not of limitation,' because the word as it is
commonly used does encompass most of what is open to the public." Welsh v. BSA, 993 F.2d
1267, 1283 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cummings, J., dissenting).
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allow blacks to become members. 70 No special circumstances exist to
explain why the 4 th and 5 th Circuits were willing to extend the reach of
Title II to the YMCA and why the 7 th Circuit refused to apply it to the
Boy Scouts. The probable explanation is that racial discrimination is
deemed morally unacceptable by the majority, while discrimination
against atheists is somehow not as egregious. Hence, the 7th Circuit
completely failed to recognize the injustice of excluding Mark and
Elliott Welsh from the Boy Scouts.
In fact, the final paragraph of the majority opinion in Welsh
reinforces that the court was completely unsympathetic to the atheist
plaintiffs and also indignant about the legal challenge they initiated to
"enduring principles." The court commented that it is
interesting to note that the challenged Boy Scout Oath
is strikingly similar to the one expressed by our
Founding Fathers on July 4, 1776 in the Declaration of
Independence which reads in part "And for the support
of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the
protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to
each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred
Honor." Certainly this Court must not upset such
enduring principles by stretching beyond recognition a
statute drafted to guarantee equal access to public
facilities.71
The Court's apparent bias against the atheist plaintiffs is clear in this
passage, and thus the result is hardly surprising.
Atheists who speak out against cultural imperialism can pay a
high price; professor Steven Epstein argues that "the ostracism that
befalls plaintiffs who challenge cherished governmental endorsements
of religion is so extreme that most who are offended by the practices
bite their tongues and go about their lives. 72 Epstein notes that the
president of the ACLU, Nadine Strossen, "recently wrote that 'often
these victims of religious liberty violations do not want to even file a
claim in court, even when we assure them they would win, because of
the hostility, enmity, persecution, and attacks they would face.'
73
According to Epstein, Strossen then recounts the harassment suffered
70. Welsh v. BSA, 787 F.Supp., 1511, 1532 (N.D.I1I., 1992).
71. Welsh v. BSA, 993 F.2d 1267, 1278 (7th Cir. 1993).
72. Epstein, supra note 27, at 2169-70.
73. Id.
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by children who refused to attend school-sponsored organized prayer
meetings in Oklahoma: the children were both harassed and insulted
by teachers and students; "upside-down crosses were taped to their
school lockers and the prize-winning goat of one of the children had its
throat slit; their mother was attacked by a school employee, who
repeatedly bashed her head against a car door and threatened to kill
her, and eventually the family's home was burned to the ground...."74
The experience of the Oklahoma family lends credibility to
Wendy Kaminer's assertion that apparent "public support for different
belief systems is matched by intolerance of disbelief., 75  Indeed,
Kaminer cites an early 1980s study in which "intolerance for atheism
was stronger even than intolerance of homosexuality."7 6  Hostility
towards atheists is perhaps due to society's tendency to blame atheists
(and other nonbelievers) for the moral decline of western civilization.
As Kaminer notes, "[v]irtuecrats from Hillary Clinton to William
Bennett to Patrick Buchanan blame America's moral decay on our lack
of religious belief., 7
7
An article by Douglas W. Kmiec, a professor of Constitutional
Law at the University of Notre Dame and former legal counsel to
Ronald Reagan, illustrates that Kaminer is not exaggerating. Kmiec's
article, entitled "America's 'Culture War': The Sinister Denial of
Virtue and the Decline of Natural Law," explicitly blames
nonbelievers for tearing apart the country in a war of culture, with the
battlegrounds in gay rights, abortion, the arts, women's rights, political
correctness, multiculturalism, and separation of church and state.
78
Asserting that the culture war is a "contest between religion and no
religion," Kmiec argues that the war is "over the source of moral
authority that governs the life of the individual and the community." 79
According to Kmiec, "[o]n the one side are those who acknowledge
the transcendent authority of God, and on the other are those who
don't. 8
74. Id.
75. Kaminer, supra note 19.
76. Kaminer notes that "only 26 percent" of those surveyed "agreed that the freedom of
atheists to make fun of God and religion 'should be legally protected no matter who might be
offended,"' and "seventy-one percent held that atheists 'who preach against God and religion'
should not be permitted to use civic auditoriums." Id.
77. Id.
78. Douglas W. Kmiec, America's "Culture War"-The Sinister Denial of Virtue and
the Decline of Natural Law, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 183, 183 (1993).
79. Id.
80. Id.
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Kmiec argues that the "camp that denies God's sovereign
authority styles themselves as progressives in pursuit of justice or
fairness," but with "numbing subtlety, hides the fact that their
normative conceptions of the just are anchored in skepticism or
materialism or worse."8 1 Kmiec's willingness to blame nonbelievers
for the moral decline of society is certainly not a new phenomenon.
Paul Edwards, editor of a collection of Russell's essays entitled Why I
Am Not a Christian, writes the following in his 1957 foreword to the
book: "At present ... we are witnessing a campaign for the revival of
religion which is carried on with all the slickness of modem
advertising techniques.... From every corner and on every level ... we
have for several years been bombarded with theological
propaganda."
82
Because religion and morality are inextricably intertwined for
believers, it is difficult for believers to imagine that one can have a
strong moral and ethical framework without a supreme being. This is
an example of the powerful effect of cultural imperialism imposed by
the dominant believers. For atheists, this persistent tendency to equate
religion and sound ethics can be extraordinarily frustrating. It means
that atheists are constantly forced to defend their ethics. Silverman
writes of himself and fellow atheists: "[w]e are moral, we are ethical,
and we're tired of being defamed and maligned for our disbelief."83
In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attack on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon, atheists have repeatedly been
maligned for their lack of belief. American Atheists note that
"humorist and E! Magazine pundit Ben Stein was apparently
misinformed on the philosophical and theological beliefs of [the
terrorists]-he described the events of September 11 as an "atheistic
evil."84 And ABC talk show host Star Jones apparently told viewers
that "she was grateful George W. Bush was a 'man of faith,' and
added that under no circumstances would she ever vote for an Atheist,
since nonbelievers presumably have no foundation for morality.
85
Such comments clearly reflect the mistaken belief that those who do
not believe in a god are evil and unethical.
Russell addresses this assumption that atheists are morally
inadequate in several of his essays. Russell notes that "[o]f all the
81. Id.
82. Paul Edwards, Editor's Introduction to WHY I AM NOT A CHRISTIAN AND OTHER
ESSAYS ON RELIGION AND RELATED SUBJECTS, xi, xii (Paul Edwards ed., 1957).
83. Silverman, supra note 3.
84. Attacks on Atheists, More "Crisis " Violations of First Amendment, supra note 47.
85. Id.
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arguments designed to show that free thought is wicked, the one most
often used is that without religion people would not be virtuous." 86
After discussing the core of his ethical beliefs-admiration for "kindly
feeling and veracity" 8 7-Russell acknowledges that many people "fear
that, without the theoretical beliefs that I find myself to reject, the
ethical beliefs which I accept could not survive."8 This assumption
that atheists are morally deficient is more than a nuisance for atheists.
Kaminer discusses how a tendency to consider "faith in immaterial
realities" essential to individual morality influences public behavior
and perceptions:
When politicians proclaim their belief in God,
regardless of their religion, they are signaling their
trustworthiness and adherence to traditional moral
codes of behavior, as well as their humility. Belief in
God levels human hierarchies while offering infallible
systems of right and wrong. By declaring your belief,
you imply that an omnipotent, omniscient (and benign)
force is the source of your values and ideas. You
appropriate the rightness of divinity.
89
Because atheists are not able to claim that their sense of ethics
is derived from a belief in a god, it is difficult for them to gain the
moral trust and respect of believers. This vividly illustrates Young's
point about the universalization of one's own experience, and how the
dominant group's universalization is essentially an act of cultural
imperialism. It is as if believers simply cannot imagine or accept that
atheists may have their own sound foundation for their moral and
ethical beliefs, or that a life without god might be fulfilling
nonetheless. In a 1998 speech, then Vice President Al Gore blamed a
host of social problems, including "gang violence and deteriorating
social conditions among inner-city youth" on those who have a
"spiritual vacuum in their lives, because they feel disconnected from
the love of their Father in Heaven." 90
86. RUSSELL, supra note 15, at 5.
87. BERTRAND RUSSELL, The Faith of a Rationalist: No Supernatural Reasons are
Needed to Make Men Kind, in THE ATHEIST VIEWPOINT 3 (1947).
88. Id. at 5.
89. Kaminer, supra note 19.
90. American Atheists, Inc., Lieberman Blames National Woes on "Freedom From
Religion, "August 29, 2000, at http://www.atheists.org/flash.Iine/elec 16.htm.
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In response to Gore's comments, American Atheists president
Ellen Johnson told the press that "[w]hether he intended to or not, Mr.
Gore is unfairly connecting a lack of belief in a god with antisocial,
criminal behavior. He ... marginalized and insulted the ten percent of
Americans-over 26 million people-who have no religious belief,
and describe themselves as atheists, nonbelievers, freethinkers, or
skeptics.... ,91 The impact of this mistrust of atheists is tremendous; as
Kaminer wryly comments, "[t]ry to imagine an avowed atheist running
successfully for public office; it's hard enough for politicians to
oppose prayer in schools."
92
Indeed, political figures often go to great lengths to call
attention to their religious faith. Democratic presidential nominee Al
Gore's unprecedented choice of Orthodox Jew Joe Lieberman as
running mate caused quite a stir among journalists and political
pundits, as well as in the Jewish community. The strategic choice of
Lieberman itself had moral and religious overtones; some political
commentators speculated that Gore's choice of a man known as a
"moralist" in the Senate was intended to counter those voters who had
been unhappy with the perceived "moral failings" of President Clinton
and, by extension, his administration. 94 And Lieberman was not shy
about making an issue not only of his own religious beliefs, but also
his apparent ambivalence about the separation of church and state.95
According to American Atheists, Lieberman said that "John
Adams, second president of the United States, wrote that our
Constitution was made only for a moral and religious people" and that
"George Washington warned us never to indulge in the supposition
that morality can be maintained without religion." 96 Lieberman also
stated, "the Constitution guarantees freedom of religion, not freedom
from religion."97  Lieberman's comments not only made American
91. Id.
92. Kaminer, supra note 19.
93. See Melanie Brubaker Mazur, Lieberman Embraced by Jewish Community, THE
DURANGO HERALD, August 12, 2000 at, available at
http://www.durangoherald.com/re1046.htm (last visited October 29, 2000).
94. See Matthew Vita, Impeachment: 2000's Stealth Issue, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2000,
at Al.
95. Lieberman has said that while the line between church and state is "an important
one,....in recent years we have gone far beyond what the Framers ever imagined in separating
the two...." American Atheists, Inc., Lieberman Again Claims "No Freedom From Religion"
In Notre Dame Address: Cites Judeo-Christian Roots of America, October 26, 2000, at
http://www.atheists.org/flash.line/elec2l .htm.
96. Lieberman Blames National Woes on "Freedom From Religion, "supra note 81.
97. Lieberman Again Claims "No Freedom from Religion" In Notre Dame Address:
Cites Judeo-Christian Roots ofAmerica, supra note 95.
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Atheists nervous, but also the Anti-Defamation League. The ADL
warned that "emphasizing personal religious faith might be
'inappropriate and even unsettling in a religiously diverse society such
as ours. "
98
And yet perhaps the American Atheists overstate the effect that
Lieberman's comments might have on atheists. After all, atheists have
become accustomed to living under state and national leaders who
make repeated public proclamations of their religious faith. In fact,
Maryland and Tennessee actually required those holding public office
to profess a belief in God until the Supreme Court declared such a
requirement unconstitutional in 1961.99  "Every President has
mentioned God in his inaugural address," and it is a "tradition that has
continued unbroken to this day. President John F. Kennedy made
three references to God in his famous inaugural speech. Similarly,
President Reagan referred continually to the deity while he was in
office. Most recently, evangelist Billy Graham led a prayer at George
Bush's and Bill Clinton's inaugurations."' 00 Such comments surely
make atheists feel marginalized; Epstein argues that "presidents should
refrain from wrapping their speeches in religious imagery, for in doing
so they certainly can make Americans feel like outsiders in their own
political community." 1
0
'
98. Id.
99. Epstein, supra note 27, at 2101.
100. Michael M. Maddigan, The Establishment Clause, Civil Religion, and the Public
Church, 81 CALIF. L. REv., 293, 322 (1993). Epstein provides the text of the prayer itself:
"Our God and Father, we thank you for this historic occasion when we inaugurate our new
President and Vice President. We thank You for the moral and spiritual foundations which
our forefathers gave us, and which are rooted deeply in Holy Scripture. Those principles have
nourished and guided us as a nation in the past. But we cannot say that we are a righteous
people, for we are not. We have sinned against You. We have sown to the wind and are now
reaping the whirlwind of crime, drug abuse, racism, immorality, and social justice. We need
to repent of our sins and to turn by faith to You.... We commit this inaugural ceremony to
You and ask that the memory of this event may always remind us to pray for our leaders. I
pray this in the name of the One who was called Wonderful Counselor, the mighty God, the
everlasting Father, and the Prince of Peace. Amen." Epstein, supra note 27, at 2108.
101. Epstein, supra note 27, at 2143.
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III. THE MARGINALIZATION OF ATHEISTS IN THE LEGAL REALM
A. The United States as a Christian Nation?
While American social and political institutions marginalize
atheists, the legal culture has been even more oblivious to the
existence and rights of nonbelievers. Law professor Daniel 0. Conkle
notes, "from the colonial period forward, Christianity has played a
prominent and leading role, both socially and politically. Indeed,
throughout most of our country's history, there has been an overt
Christian, and primarily Protestant, dominance in American law and
public life."' ' To support his assertion, Conkle cites a famous 1892
Supreme Court case, Rector, Holy Trinity Church v. United States.
10 3
For contemporary readers, the case represents a startling example of
religious single-mindedness.
Writing for the Court, Justice Brewer stated that "this is a
religious people.... Every constitution of every one of the forty-four
states contains language which either directly or by clear implication
recognizes a profound reverence for religion and an assumption that its
influence in all human affairs is essential to the well being of the
community."' 0 4 Justice Brewer then concluded that "this is a Christian
nation," based on such practices as the "form of oath universally
prevailing, concluding with an appeal to the Almighty; the custom of
opening sessions of all deliberative bodies and most conventions with
prayer ... the laws respecting the observance of the Sabbath, with the
general cessation of all secular business, and the closing of courts ...
[and] legislatures ... on that day.... 105
The language of an 1882 child custody decision of the Supreme
Court of Arkansas makes the atheists' legal disadvantage evident. In
that case, the state was seeking to remove the son of James Grisby and
his wife (the child's stepmother) from their custody based on their
egregious abuse and neglect of the child. 10 6 The opinion of Judge
English, quoting Justice Story, acknowledged that there is a
presumption that children belong in the custody of their parents, but
that
102. Daniel 0. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original
Theology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1 (2000).
103. Id.
104. 143 U.S. 457,471 (1892).
105. Id.
106. State v. Grisby, 38 Ark. 406, 409 (1882).
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whenever ... it is found that a father is guilty of gross
ill-treatment or cruelty towards his infant children, or
that he is in constant habits of drunkenness or
blasphemy, or low and gross debauchery, or that he
possesses atheistical or irreligious principles, or that
his domestic associations are such as tend to the
corruption and contamination of his children, or that he
otherwise acts in a manner injurious to the morals or
interests of his children ... the Court of Chancery will
interfere, and deprive him of the custody of his children
(emphasis added).... 107
Indeed, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland noted in
Montgomery County Department of Social Services v. Sanders that the
longstanding English common law tradition of favoring fathers in
child custody disputes remained unbroken until early in the 1 9 th
century. 10 8 The father's atheism was the decisive factor in this case.
The Maryland court noted that it was "not until the Victorian Era that a
father lost a custody dispute in England. The dubious award for 'first
loser' was presented to the famous poet, Percy Bysshe Shelley by Lord
Eldin." ' 09 According to the Maryland court, Lord Eldin "described
Shelley's atheistic beliefs as vicious and immoral and refused to give
him custody of his children."1 0
Conkle notes that forty years after Church of the Holy Trinity,
the United States Supreme Court "officially reaffirmed that 'we are a
Christian people"' in United States v. MacIntosh."'1 Conkle argues
that while "this sort of language was soon to disappear from judicial
opinions ... the legal favoritism of Christianity continued for some
time. In public schools, for example, Christian prayers and Bible
readings remained common for another 30 years-until the Supreme
Court banned them in its 1962 and 1963 decisions."'"12  Now,
107. Id. A 1978 decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals cites Grisby but notes that
"Mr. Justice Story's pronouncement that atheists or person's with 'irreligious principles' are
unfit parents is without the ambit of the First Amendment. The Constitutional right to
Freedom of Religion carries with it the concommitant right to 'freedom from religion."'
Montgomery County Department of Social Services v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406 (1978).
108. 38 Md. App. 406, 381 A.2d 1154 (1978).
109. Id. at415.
110. Id.
111. Conkle, supra note 102, at 5 (quoting United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 625
(1931)).
112. Id. (citing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203 (1963)).
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according to Conkle, "the Court has renounced the Christian
dominance that prevailed 'at one time,' and it has interpreted the
religion clauses to reflect a strong constitutional commitment to equal
treatment for all religions, Christian and non-Christian alike."
113
However, there is ample evidence to suggest that Conkle's
conclusions about equal treatment cannot be extended to atheists. For
instance, in a 1987 modification of child custody hearing, the Court of
Appeals of Texas made the following observations about the child's
father, Ronald Griffin:
[Vicki Griffin] contends that [Ronald Griffin] has
engaged in immoral, unethical acts that have set a bad
example for the children. [She] and several of her co-
workers testified that [Ronald Griffin] hounded [Vicki
Griffin] to file a fraudulent health insurance claim for
him.... [Vicki Griffin] also testified that [Ronald
Griffin] had kept and spent $900 that he knew had been
mistakenly paid to him by his employer, Texas A&M
University. [Ronald Griffin] is an atheist. He has never
taken the children to church by himself.'
14
The court never indicated why Ronald Griffin's atheism is listed in
this paragraph, which otherwise involves explicit allegations of
wrongdoing. In doing so, the judge appears to have categorized Mr.
Griffin's atheism as a moral. failing analogous to fraud or theft.
Quantifying just how the judge's view of atheists may have shaped his
decision in this custody battle is difficult. But-based on this
paragraph-it seems possible that Mr. Griffin's atheism was a
significant strike against him in the mind of the judge.
B. Ceremonial Deism
The categorization of certain practices as "ceremonial deism"
may explain why the equal treatment Conkle refers to has not yet been
extended to atheists. According to Epstein, the term "ceremonial
deism" was coined by former Yale Law School Dean Walter Rostow.
The term refers to a "class of public activity" that could be accepted as
"so conventional and uncontroversial as to be constitutional."'' 15
113. Conkle, supra note 102, at 6.
114. Griffin v. Griffin, 1987 LEXIS 8948, 38-39 (Tex. App. 1987).
115. Epstein, supra note 27, at 2091.
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Courts have used the phrase to justify the constitutionality of a wide
range of practices, from the recognition of certain religious holidays as
national holidays to the inscribing of "In God We Trust" on our coins
and paper currency.
Epstein incorporates these examples and others in an imagined
scenario to illustrate how saturated our lives are with religious
observances that many barely notice because the practices are
congruent with the religious views of the majority:
The year is 2096.... Muslims now comprise seventy-
percent of the American population, while Christians
and Jews comprise only 25-percent collectively....
[S]tudents in most public school systems begin each
day with the Pledge of Allegiance in which they
dutifully recite that America is one nation "under
Allah;" our national currency...contains the inscription
codified as our national motto, "In Allah We Trust;"
witnesses in court proceedings and public officials are
sworn in by government officials asking them to place
one hand on the Koran and to conclude "so help me
Allah;" presidential addresses are laced with appeals to
Allah; federal and state legislative proceedings begin
with a formal prayer typically delivered by a Muslim
chaplain in which supplications to Allah are unabashed;
state and federal judicial proceedings-including
proceedings before the United States Supreme Court-
begin with the invocation "Allah save this honorable
court;" and, pursuant to federal and state law, only
Muslim holy days are officially celebrated as national
holidays.... Would the average Christian or Jew
seriously contend that this America of 2096 would not
make them feel like outsiders in their own country?"
16
The world described by Epstein is one in which atheists live each and
every day, treated as though their views somehow can be disregarded.
Because almost everyone believes in a god, theists cannot imagine
why a small minority might object to these "innocent" expressions of
religious faith.
116. Epstein, supra note 27, at 2084-2085.
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Indeed, American legal culture is steeped in religious traditions
that leave atheists feeling like outsiders but that have been upheld by
courts based on their classification as mere "ceremonial deism." The
courts appear to cast a particular practice as ceremonial deism to avoid
striking down longstanding religious traditions or practices that seem
particularly innocuous and inconsequential in a nation dominated by
believers. Michael Maddigan notes that ceremonial deism is a "vague
concept" that the Supreme Court has used to "justify some of the
practices with which it has been confronted," but that the Court has
"never really defined ceremonial deism." 117 Maddigan argues that the
term "seems to be shorthand for the Court's judgment that a practice
ought to be permissible because it is not really religious..." 118
Ceremonial deism plays a significant role in the legal
marginalization of atheists for two reasons. First, it is used to justify
practices that constitute a government endorsement of theism. These
same practices would clearly be held unconstitutional if they were
subjected to the usual tests for determining whether there is an
Establishment Clause violation. By casting the practice as mere
"ceremonial deism," the Court simply bypasses the application of the
Lemon test-the traditional test for evaluating possible Establishment
Clause violations. One scholar, Professor Steven G. Gey, asserts that
"[a]pplied rigorously, the operative terms of Lemon-secular purpose,
secular effect, and entanglement-could be effective tools in
separating government from religion .... An honest application of the
Lemon test would require a far more rigorous separation of church and
state than a majority of the Supreme Court is willing to enforce." '"19
Second, the characterization of certain practices as "ceremonial
deism" can be used as a springboard to validate other religious
practices. Epstein explains the argument as follows:
[I]f practices such as the Pledge of Allegiance to a
nation "under God," legislative prayer, the invocation
of God prior to court proceedings, and the Christmas
holiday are permissible notwithstanding the
Establishment Clause, then surely the practice at hand
(be it a nativity scene, commencement invocation, or
some other governmental practice)-which does not
117. Maddigan, supra note 100, at 337.
118. Id.
119. Steven G. Gey, Religious Coercion and the Establishment Clause, 1994 U. ILL. L.
REv. 463 (1994).
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advance religion "any more than" these accepted
practices-must also pass muster under the
Establishment Clause. 
120
Thus, ceremonial deism creates a slippery slope that can lead courts to
uphold religious practices based on this "any more than" test, rather
than the Lemon test the Court crafted to address possible
Establishment Clause violations.
C. Using Ceremonial Deism to Validate Practices that Would
Probably Fail the Lemon Test
In the landmark 1971 case of Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme
Court established a framework for evaluating challenges under the
Establishment Clause. 12  The Court held that to pass constitutional
muster, a federal, state, or municipal act must (1) have a secular
legislative purpose; 122 (2) have a principal or primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) not foster excessive
government entanglement with religion. 23  Since Lemon, the Court
has wavered in its application of the Lemon test.124 Steven Gey argues
that "the Court's application of Lemon has been erratic, contradictory,
and arguably irrational."' 125  But while "the continued vitality of the
120. Epstein, supra note 27, at 2086.
121. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
122. The Supreme Court has suggested a variety of legitimate "purposes" that might be
served by a governmental acknowledgement of religion. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668
(1984) In Lynch, O'Connor justifies "such governmental 'acknowledgments' of religion as
legislative prayers, ... government declaration of Thanksgiving as a public holiday, printing of
'In God We Trust' on coins, and opening court sessions with 'God save the United States and
this honorable court' as serving, "in the only ways reasonably possible in our culture, the
legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the
future, and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in our society. For
that reason, and because of their history and ubiquity, those practices are not understood as
conveying governmental approval of particular religious beliefs." Id. at 693 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). The intriguing thing about the justifications offered by Justice O'Connor is that
references to God only serve these purposes for theists; for atheists, these practices have quite
the opposite effect. Referring to an entity one does not believe to exist seems silly, rather than
solemn; it is entirely unrelated to any confidence one might have in the future (indeed, many
atheists argue that belief in God stems from a fear of what the future holds); and it represents
the very worst of society (irrationality and a lack of confidence in the capacities of human
kind). Thus, the justifications offered by Justice O'Connor reflect her universalization of her
own view of what these religious practices are meant to do, and are an excellent example of
the cultural imperialism theists impose on the rest of society.
123. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
124. See generally Gey, supra note 119.
125. Gey,supra note 119.
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Lemon test is still much in doubt,"' 26 the test has not yet been
overruled. The Court has splintered on several recent Establishment
Clause cases, and several Justices have offered alternative tests, 127 but
Lemon appears to exert a powerful influence on the Court's legal
analysis.
Justice O'Connor has added an additional element to the
Lemon test that she deems to be a "clarification."' 128  In Lynch v.
Donnelly, Justice O'Connor stated that the Establishment Clause
"prohibits government from making adherence to a religion relevant in
any way to a person's standing in the political community.' ' 2 9 Justice
O'Connor argued that the government could violate this prohibition in
two ways: (1) excessive governmental entanglement with religious
institutions and (2) government endorsement that "sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community."' 
30
If the "clarified" Lemon test was both consistently and
carefully applied by the courts, practices permitted as "ceremonial
deism" would probably be ruled -unconstitutional. Because the courts
have created an exception for these practices, atheists continue to
suffer marginalization perpetuated by flawed legal analysis and an
unwillingness to apply the Lemon test consistently. 131  Epstein
suggests that "[i]f ... the Court means what it says when it espouses
the principle that government may not, consistent with the
Establishment Clause, endorse religion and send messages to citizens
that cause them to feel like outsiders in the political community, the
Court should have the intellectual honesty and fortitude to recognize
that ceremonial deism violates a core purpose of the Establishment
Clause."' 32 Indeed, a close look at the practices the Court refers to as
126. Norman Dorsen & Thomas Viles, The Lynch and Allegheny Religious Symbols
Cases and the Decline of the Lemon Test, in RELIGION AND AMERICAN LAW: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA 283, 290 (Paul Finkelman, ed., 2000).
127. Justice Kennedy has advocated the coercion test, which would invalidate practices
under the Establishment Clause only if they coerce someone to assent to a religious belief or to
participate in a religious activity. See Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion in Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
128. Lynch v. Donnelly 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 688.
131. See generally Gey, supra note 119.
132. Epstein, supra note 27, at 2174.
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"ceremonial deism" reveals that they fail the modified Lemon test and
thus violate the Establishment Clause. 133
1. Religious Oaths
One prominent example of ceremonial deism is the oaths
required of public officers, court witnesses, and jurors. Under English
common law, "no one but a believer in God and in a future state of
rewards and punishments could serve on a jury or testify as a witness.
The oath was taken on a Christian Bible, in effect disqualifying non-
Christians."'' 34 Further, "as late as 1939, five states and the District of
Columbia excluded the testimony of those professing a disbelief in
God, and, in a dozen or so additional states, the testimony of
nonbelievers was subject to attack on the ground that one's credibility
was impaired by irreligion or lack of belief in a deity."' 35 According
to Epstein, "oaths on the bible are still standard fare in American
courtrooms today; witnesses, grand jurors, prospective petit jurors, and
interpreters are all asked to swear to tell the truth, 'so help me
God. ""13
6
Requiring a religious oath in court creates an uncomfortable
experience for nonbelievers. The oath requires a witness or juror who
does not believe in a god to participate in a ritual that conflicts with
her own view of the world, or, alternatively, "publicly declare her
disbelief in front of (and with the likely disapproval of) a judge and
her fellow citizens."' 37 Thus, the courtroom oath fails the second and
third prongs of the Lemon test. The oath has the effect of advancing
religion in the sense meant by Justice O'Connor-by requiring a
religious oath, the judicial system endorses a belief in God. Further, it
represents excessive entanglement. Epstein notes that "[i]ndispensable
to that oath and to the administration of justice is the Christian Bible,
which is typically left in open view in American trial courtrooms."'' 38
Indeed, even when a court does not use an explicitly religious
oath to assure truth-telling, atheists may find the alternative
1haffirmation equally offensive. However, the 5 Circuit was entirely
133. The categories of ceremonial deism set out in this section are drawn from Steven
Epstein's article. He classifies a group of practices as "core ceremonial deism," which he
defines as "practices which have been noncontroversial, have resulted in very little litigation,
and have never been held unconstitutional by any court." Id. at 2095.
134. Id. at2111.
135. Id. at 2111-12.
136. Id. at 2112.
137. Id. at 2146-47.
138. Id. at2146.
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unsympathetic to an atheist making such an argument. In Society of
Separationists v. Herman, Robin Murray-O'Hair challenged both her
exclusion from venire that resulted from her refusal to give an oath or
affirmation and the judge's decision to hold her in contempt for that
refusal. O'Hair was jailed for several hours before she was released
on bond. O'Hair argued that she considered both an oath and an
affirmation to be religious in nature, and she asked the court both to
"'declare the juror oath practice as engaged in by the defendants (a
judicial coercion of a religious exercise) to be unconstitutional under
the First Amendment' and to 'grant injunctive relief, both temporary
and permanent, against the continuation of such unconstitutional jury
oath practices by judges and other public officials."1 39
The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment, concluding that the named defendants other than Judge
Herman were either immune, nonexistent entities, or improperly
named. 140 On appeal, a divided panel of the 5th Circuit determined that
Herman "erred in debating the correctness of O'Hair's religious beliefs
rather than asking her what sort of pledge she could make to commit
herself to tell the truth." The 5 th Circuit issued a "declaratory
judgment requiring judges to ask prospective jurors who object to the
oath or affirmation requirement what form of serious public
commitment would accord with their constitutionally protected
beliefs." 14 ' After a rehearing en banc, the 5th Circuit concluded that
O'Hair and the Society of Separationists lacked "standing to obtain
declaratory relief against Judge Herman."'' 42  The court noted that
O'Hair suffered "no continuing harm" and was not able to show a
"real and immediate threat that she will again appear before Judge
Herman as a prospective juror and that Judge Herman will again
exclude her from jury service and jail her for contempt."'143
Judge Weiner dissented, stating that the most disturbing aspect
of the court's decision was that "neither O'Hair nor the Society has
any way to pursue redress of the First Amendment violations
perpetrated by the state trial judge.... If there is any principle of the
Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other
it is the principle of free thought-not free thought for those who agree
with us but freedom for the thought we hate."'14 Judge Goldberg also
139. Society of Separationists v. Herman, 959 F.2d 1283, 1284-85 (5th Cir. 1992).
140. Id. at 1285.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1284.
143. Id. at 1285-86.
144. Id. at 1290 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
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dissented, arguing that O'Hair and the Society have standing because
they are "susceptible to injury precisely because they are not like the
average Joe: they are not willing to conform to the popular view that
an affirmation is not a religious exercise."1 45 Judge Goldberg noted
that the plaintiffs "merely seek a declaration that Judge Herman may
not exclude or incarcerate a prospective juror for refusing to affirm
until he has proposed that the prospective juror make a nonreligious,
conscience-binding declaration of a commitment to tell the truth."
146
Unlike the majority, Judge Goldberg recognized that O'Hair
was being punished merely for subscribing to an unconventional view
about the religious nature of affirmations. Thus, Judge Goldberg's
opinion seemed to acknowledge that the majority effectively
marginalized O'Hair by refusing to provide a forum for redress for a
violation of her First Amendment rights.
2. Religious Invocations Prior to Judicial Proceedings
Courts themselves have a religious atmosphere that can
marginalize atheists. "The invocation 'God Save the United States and
this Honorable Court' has been used to convene Supreme Court
sessions since the time John Marshall was Chief Justice and continues
today as a standard practice in federal courts."'14 7 Maddigan argues
that such invocations are not truly religious, but rather examples of
civil religion. According to Maddigan, the "God" of civil religion is
"mythic, patriotic, and secular."' 148 To an atheist, the notion that God
is a secular concept is truly absurd. As Epstein points out, those who
are "required to be in court to conduct official business must listen to
the government's endorsement of a transcendent, monotheistic, Judeo-
Christian God."
149
Because the use of religious invocations to open judicial
proceedings indicates the government's clear approval of and
adherence to a theistic religious perspective, it violates the
endorsement prong of the Lemon test. In Lynch, Justice O'Connor
asserted in her concurrence that "the effect prong asks whether,
irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice under review
in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval.... An
affirmative answer to [the] question should render the challenged
145. Id. at 1292 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
146. Id.
147. Epstein, supra note 27, at 2111.
148. Maddigan, supra note 100, at 326.
149. Epstein, supra note 27, at 2143.
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practice invalid."15 With this test in mind, it is difficult to imagine
how religious invocations prior to judicial proceedings would pass
constitutional muster. Justice Douglas once noted that a "fastidious
atheist or agnostic could even object to the supplication with which the
Court opens each session: 'God save the United States and this
Honorable Court," ' 151 in an effort to support his argument that
separation of church and state need not be absolute. Indeed, an atheist
could object, and if the practice were properly evaluated under the
Lemon test, it would be declared unconstitutional.
By classifying the practice as ceremonial deism, the courts
have avoided subjecting religious judicial invocations to critical
analysis. The Supreme Court, and other courts, frequently refer to
judicial invocations without any suggestion that they might violate the
Constitution. The practice is simply understood to be acceptable
because courts have done it for so long. For instance, in Marsh v.
Chambers, which involved a challenge to legislative prayer, the Court
noted that in "the very courtrooms in which the United States District
Judge and later three Circuit Judges heard and decided this case, the
proceedings opened with an announcement that concluded, 'God save
the United States and this Honorable Court.' The same invocation
occurs in all sessions of this Court."' 52 No further support was offered
for the constitutional validity of the practice; the fact that the practice
takes place seemed to be enough for the Court to assume its validity.
3. Legislative Prayer
Legislative prayer is common in state legislatures. 53 The
United States Congress also opens each day with a prayer led by "an
ordained, appropriately attired Christian minister delivering a formal
prayer to God (and often, to Jesus Christ). 154  Further, "[e]very
Chaplain selected by Congress in more than 200 years of its existence
has been Christian."'' 55 Epstein explains the marginalizing effect this
practice has for nonbelievers: "Americans who regularly observe
congressional proceedings quickly ascertain .that these prayers
embrace them only.if they happen to be Christian. How else could a
non-Christian interpret a prayer that our civilization 'can only be saved
150. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
151. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
152. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983).
153. Epstein, supra note 27, at 2104.
154. Id. at2137.
155. Id. at2138.
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by becoming permeated with the spirit of Christ' and prayers of
similar substance?"'
156
Incredibly, the Supreme Court has held that legislative prayer
is not in fact a violation of the Establishment Clause. In Marsh v.
Chambers, the Supreme. Court upheld Nebraska's practice of
employing a state-appointed chaplain to open each session of its
legislature with a prayer. The Supreme Court stated that the "opening
of sessions of legislative and other deliberative public bodies with
prayer is deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this
country."' 57  The Court used that premise to declare the practice
constitutional:
In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of
more than 200 years, there can be no doubt that the
practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer has
become part of the fabric of our society. To invoke
Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with
making the laws is not, in these circumstances, an
"establishment" of religion or a step toward
establishment; it is simply a tolerable acknowledgment
of beliefs widely held among people of this country. 158
What is astonishing about Marsh is that the Supreme Court
"ma[de] no pretense of subjecting Nebraska's practice of legislative
prayer to any of the formal 'tests' that have traditionally structured
[the Court's] inquiry under the Establishment Clause."' 1 9  Scholars
Peter Schotten and Dennis Stevens assert that "a straightforward
application of Lemon would have dictated outlawing ... chaplain-led
public prayers."' 60 Justice Brennan, in his dissent in Marsh, clearly
agreed, stating that "if the Court were to judge legislative prayer
through the unsentimental eye of our settled doctrine, it would have to
strike it down as a clear violation of the Establishment Clause."' 16 1
Justice Brennan noted that the Lemon test should have been applied,
and further stated that he had "no doubt that, if any group of law
students were asked to apply the principles of Lemon to the question
156. Id.
157. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983).
158. Id. at 792.
159. Id. at 796 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
160. PETER SCHOTTEN & DENNIS STEVENS, RELIGION, POLITICS, AND THE LAW:
COMMENTARIES AND CONTROVERSIES 151 (1996).
161. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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of legislative prayer, they would nearly unanimously find the practice
to be unconstitutional."
162
Justice Brennan's own analysis in his Marsh dissent makes it
clear that legislative prayer does violate the Establishment Clause
when properly analyzed in accordance with the Lemon test. Indeed,
legislative prayer violates all three prongs of the test. First, Justice
Brennan asserted that it is "self-evident" that the "'purpose' of
legislative prayer is pre-eminently religious."' 163  Second, Justice
Brennan argued that the "'primary effect' of legislative prayer is also
clearly religious ... invocations in Nebraska's legislative halls
explicitly link religious belief and observance to the power and
prestige of the state. ' 164
In an amicus brief filed in the Marsh case, Jon Garth Murray,
Madalyn Murray O'Hair, and the Society of Separationists echoed the
argument that legislative prayer violates the second prong of the
Lemon test. They also indicated in the amicus brief the marginalizing
effect these prayers have on nonbelievers:
These prayers offered by Congress' chaplains have the
undeniable purpose and effect of advancing a particular
religious viewpoint. These prayers not only implicitly
endorse belief in God by the mere fact that they are
being offered, but are also used as vehicles for
expressly urging the legislators to believe in God, since,
according to the chaplains, disbelief will lead to a
situation in which there is "no morality, no justice," and
in which "we will be ruled by tyrants" who are less than
fully human. Amici are, to say the least, offended by
these remarks, which are subsidized by their tax dollars,
as any Christian, Jew, Buddhist or Moslem would
understandably be offended were they forced to
subsidize sermons to our nation's legislators which
branded them as immoral and less than fully human
162. Id. at 800-801.
163. Id. at 797. Brennan cited the chaplain's own explanation of his role as
evidence of this purpose. The chaplain, Reverend Palmer, made the following
statement:
I would say that I strive to relate the Senators and their helpers to the
divine.... [My] purpose is to provide an opportunity for Senators to be
drawn closer to their understanding of God as they understand God. In
order that the divine wisdom might be theirs as they conduct their business
for the day. Id. at 798.
164. Id. at 798.
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simply because of what they believed. But whether the
chaplains are correct in saying atheists are immoral or
less than fully human is beside the point. What is
important is that through their prayers the chaplains
advance a particular religious viewpoint, and, therefore,
they have no right to expect this nation's taxpayers to
provide them with the funds for doing so.1
65
The legislative prayers also violate the third prong of the
Lemon test, according to Justice Brennan, because the "process of
choosing a 'suitable' chaplain ... and insuring that the chaplain limits
himself or herself to 'suitable' prayers, involves precisely the sort of
supervision that agencies of government should if at all possible
avoid."' 166  This selection process involves an inappropriate-and
unconstitutional-level of governmental entanglement in religious
matters.
Perhaps most satisfying for atheists is Justice Brennan's
recognition that the legislative prayers effectively marginalize those
Americans who profess no religious belief, or whose religious beliefs
do not coincide with those expressed in the prayer. Justice Brennan
noted that "no American should at any point feel alienated from his
government because the government has declared or acted upon some
'official' or 'authorized' point of view on a matter of religion." Justice
Brennan argued that:
legislative prayer clearly violates the principles of
neutrality and separation that are embedded within the
Establishment Clause.... It intrudes on the right to
conscience by forcing some legislators either to
participate in a "prayer opportunity" ... with which they
are in basic disagreement or to make their disagreement
a matter of public comment by declining to participate.
It forces all residents of the state to support a religious
exercise that may be contrary to their own beliefs. It
requires the state to commit itself on fundamental
theological issues... 1
67
165. Brief of Amici Curiae for Jon Garth Murray, Madalyn Murray O'Hair, and the
Society of Separationists, Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (No. 82-23).
166. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 799 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 808.
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However, any satisfaction atheists feel because of Justice
Brennan's awareness of how legislative prayer can alienate
nonbelievers is tempered by the disappointing recognition that the
Court chose to uphold the practice without even subjecting it to
appropriate critical constitutional analysis. Even conservative Justice
Kennedy has admitted that "it seems incredible to suggest that the
average observer of legislative prayer who either believes in no
religion or whose faith rejects the concept of God would not receive a
clear message that his faith is out of step with the political norm."
'1 68
However, legislative prayer continues at the federal level and the state
level, thus perpetuating feelings of invisibility and exclusion among
nonbelievers.
4. National Day of Prayer
In 1952, the House of Representatives and the Senate passed a
joint resolution establishing the National Day of Prayer. 169  The
resolution requires that the President proclaim a day as the National
Day of Prayer on which "people 'may turn to God in prayer and
meditation at churches, in groups, and as individuals."" 70  Reverend
Billy Graham suggested the resolution.17 ' And, "[s]ince 1952, every
President has issued such a proclamation."'' 72 Epstein notes that in
1995, "President Clinton's proclamation urged Americans to 'continue
to seek the guidance of God in all the affairs of our Nation.""
173
The National Day of Prayer has never been challenged in court;
indeed, it seems unlikely that anyone would have standing to bring
such a challenge. 174 Further, the Court has frequently referred to the
National Day of Prayer in dicta in ways that indicate that the Court
168. Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 673-674 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Significantly, Justice Kennedy was not offering this comment to support a finding that
legislative prayer ought to be struck down as a violation of the Establishment Clause. Rather,
he was attempting to use this argument to illustrate that the endorsement test proposed by
Justice O'Connor is deeply flawed. He goes on to comment that "[e]ither the endorsement test
must invalidate scores of traditional practices recognizing the place religion holds in our
culture, or it must be twisted and stretched to avoid inconsistency with practices we know
have been permitted in the past, while condemning similar practices with no greater
endorsement effect simply by reason of their lack of historical antecedent. Neither result is
acceptable." Id.
169. William Funk, National Day of Prayer, in RELIGION AND AMERICAN LAW: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA 329 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2000).
170. Id.
171. Epstein, supra note 27, at 2116.
172. Id. at2117.
173. Id. at2118.
174. Funk, supra note 169, at 329, 329-30.
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believes it to be constitutional. In Lynch, "the Court used the National
Day of Prayer as one of several examples in which government
officially acknowledged religion in order to demonstrate that not all
such acknowledgments violate the Establishment Clause.' ' 75 The
National Day of Prayer has been categorized with practices the Court
deems ceremonial deism. 176 However, if the National Day of Prayer
could be subjected to the Lemon test it would probably be found
unconstitutional.
First, the explicit purpose of the National Day of Prayer-to set
aside a day for Americans to turn to God-is clearly religious. 77 One
Senate sponsor of the resolution "stressed a need for divine guidance
at this particular time due to threats 'at home and abroad by the
corrosive forces of communism which seek simultaneously to destroy
our democratic way of life and the faith in an Almighty God on which
it is based."",178 Second, the National Day of Prayer clearly advances
religion under Justice O'Connor's endorsement test. Justice Kennedy
has referred to the statute as "a straightforward endorsement of the
concept of 'turn[ing] to God in prayer."", 179
In short, the National Day of Prayer clearly seems to involve
government endorsement of "the religious practices and beliefs of
some citizens." Thus, the National Day of Prayer sends a "clear
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders or less than full
members of the political community" while sending a "corresponding
message to Christians that they are favored members of the political
community."' 8 0 The fact that a mostly Christian Congress chose to
impose the National Day of Prayer on a country dominated by
believers constitutes an appalling act of cultural imperialism. It is as if
nonbelievers either do not exist or are so unimportant that they can be
ignored. The National Day of Prayer thus both reflects and contributes
to the marginalization of nonbelievers.
5. The National Motto: "In God We Trust"
Many Americans may not be aware of the National Day of
Prayer or the practice of opening legislative sessions with a prayer.
However, anyone who has examined a coin or paper bill is aware that
175. Id. at 330.
176. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 677 (1984).
177. Epstein, supra note 27, at 2151.
178. Id. at2117.
179. Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 672 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
180. This is the endorsement test set out by Justice O'Connor in Allegheny v. ACLU at
626-627.
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the phrase "In God We Trust" appears on both. Indeed, by law, the
phrase is the national motto of the United States.' 8 1 The phrase was
adopted as the national motto in 1956. 18 Several atheists challenged
the inscription of the phrase on coins and paper currency
unsuccessfully. In the earliest legal challenges, the phrase was not
termed "ceremonial deism." Later, in numerous court decisions-
including Supreme Court decisions-the courts referred to the phrase
as an example of ceremonial deism "not rising to the level of an
Establishment Clause violation."'18
3
In 1970, the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit considered a
challenge to the national motto in Aronow v. United States. The court
ruled that the motto is "excluded from First Amendment significance
because [it] has no theological or ritualistic impact. As stated in the
Congressional Report, it has 'spiritual and psychological value' and
'inspirational quality."' 184 Perhaps because the court decided that the
motto had no "religious significance,"' 185 it did not even bother to
apply the Lemon test.
However, in 1996, the Court of Appeals for the 1 0th Circuit
considered a similar challenge to the national motto in Gaylor v.
Smith.'86 Although the court ultimately decided that the national
motto is an example of ceremonial deism, it did attempt to apply the
Lemon test.187 However, the court's analysis under the Lemon test
clearly indicates that it approached the issue with little understanding
of the perspective of nonbelievers. Thus, the court perpetuates the
cultural and legal dominance of believers because of its inability-and
perhaps its unwillingness-to perceive and understand the objections
of nonbelievers.
The statute establishing "In God We Trust" should have been
held to violate the first prong of the Lemon test since its legislative
purpose was clearly religious. The sponsor of the legislation made the
following statement on the floor of the House:
In these days when imperialistic and materialistic
communism seeks to attack and to destroy freedom, it is
181. 36 USC § 186 (1956) reincorporated at 36 USC § 302 (1998).
182. William Funk, "In God We Trust, " in RELIGION AND AMERICAN LAW: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA 239 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2000).
183. Id.
184. Aronow v. U.S., 432 F.2d 242, 244 (9th Cir. 1970).
185. Id. at 243.
186. 74 F. 3d 214 (10th Cir. 1996).
187. Gaylor v. Smith, 74 F. 3d 214, 216 (10th Cir. 1996).
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proper for us to seek continuously for ways to
strengthen the foundation of our freedom. At the base
of our freedom is our faith in God and the desire of
Americans to live by His will and by His Guidance. As
long as this country trusts in God, it will prevail. To
remind of us this self-evident truth, it is proper that our
currency should carry these inspiring words, coming
down to us through our history: "In God We Trust."'
' 88
In Gaylor, the 10t h Circuit ignored the legislative purpose of the
statute entirely.
The court did attempt to evaluate the "In God We Trust"
statute under the ."effect" prong of the Lemon test. The court
determined that the "motto symbolizes the historical role of religion in
our society, formalizes our medium of exchange, fosters patriotism,
and expresses confidence in the future."' 189 According to the court, the
"motto's primary effect is not to advance religion; instead, it is a form
of 'ceremonial deism' which through historical usage and ubiquity
cannot be reasonably understood to convey government approval of
religious belief."' 90
The court then turned to the endorsement prong of the Lemon
test, and stated that the standard is whether a "reasonable observer
would view the practice as endorsement."' 91 Noting that Justice
O'Connor has said that "the endorsement inquiry is not about the
perceptions of particular individuals or saving isolated nonadherents
from the discomfort of viewing symbols of faith to which they do not
subscribe,"' 192 the court concluded that a "reasonable observer, .... aware
of the purpose, context, and history of the phrase, would not consider
its reproduction on U.S. currency to be an endorsement of religion."'
193
By using the "reasonable observer," the court was able to evaluate the
phrase from the perspective of a believer, rather than the "isolated
nonadherent."' 94
That the court could view "In God We Trust" as anything but a
blatant endorsement of monotheism is truly astonishing. An atheist
reading the phrase on a coin is surely aware that the "we" in the phrase
188. Epstein, supra note 27, at 2123.
189. See Gaylor, 74 F. 3d at 216.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 217.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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printed by the government on U.S. currency cannot possibly include
those who do not believe in a god. American Atheists, in a written
statement to Congress, argued that the phrase is "a religious phrase
showing that the government has selected and established a particular
monotheistic type of religion."' 195 Indeed, by printing the phrase and
establishing it as a national motto, the government has clearly
indicated its support of the notion expressed in the phrase.
6. "One Nation Under God": The Pledge ofAllegiance
In 1954, Congress added "under God" to the text of the Pledge
of Allegiance.' 96 Although the added text has rarely been challenged
in court, this has "not stopped numerous courts from mentioning the
provision ... always in the context of a list of situations in which the
federal government by statute or practice acknowledges God. In each
circumstance the reference suggests that the Supreme Court believes
the provision constitutional." 97  For instance, in Lynch, Justice
Brennan wrote: "I would suggest that such practices as ... the
references to God contained in the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag can
best be understood.. .as a form of 'ceremonial deism,' protected from
Establishment Clause scrutiny chiefly because they have lost through
rote repetition any significant religious content."' 98 However, if the
addition of "under God" to the Pledge of Allegiance were evaluated
under the Lemon test, it seems likely that it would fail.
First, the explicit purpose of the addition of "under God" to the
pledge was religious. Epstein offers the following description of the
political atmosphere of the time:
[T]here was the conclusion that something was needed
to distinguish America from its atheistic Cold War
rival. Representatives and Senators making this
distinction referred to atheism as being amoral, evil,
and certainly un-American.... The symbolism of
placing the words "'under God' on millions of lips"
was likened to "running up a believer's flag as the
witness of a great nation's faith" to forcefully remind
195. God on Our Coins: Hearings on H.R. 3314 Before the Subcommittee on Consumer
Affairs and Coinage of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 100th
Congress (1988) (written statement of Jon G. Murray, President, American Atheists, Inc.).
196. William Funk, Pledge of Allegiance, in RELIGION AND AMERICAN LAW: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA 364, 367 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2000).
197. Id. at 367-68.
198. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984).
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"those who deny the sacred sanctities which it
symbolizes" that, like it or not, theirs is a nation that
believes devoutly in God.199
The House Judiciary Committee concluded that adding the phrase to
the pledge would "serve to deny the atheistic and materialistic
concepts of communism." 200 This history clearly indicates that the
phrase "under God" was intended to endorse a belief in God.
Second, the effect of the addition amounts to endorsement.
The daily recitation of the phrase in public schools throughout the
country "sends a message to students who do not believe in a
monotheistic god 'that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community' and instills in them a perception of 'disapproval
of their individual religious choices."' 20  Even conservative Justice
Kennedy has admitted that "it borders on sophistry to suggest that the
'reasonable' atheist would not feel less than a 'full membe[r] of the
political community' every time his fellow Americans recited, as part
of their expression of patriotism and love for country, a phrase he
believed to be false. 20 2 The phrase clearly has-and was intended to
have-a religious effect. Thus, the phrase represents the imposition of
the religious beliefs of the majority on all, an act of cultural
imperialism that renders atheists and other nonbelievers invisible or
irrelevant.
D. Using Ceremonial Deism to Justify Other Religious Practices
Some may think that quibbling about such seemingly
innocuous practices as courtroom oaths and national mottoes is silly.
For those who fail to see the way that these practices isolate and
ostracize nonbelievers, it may be hard to imagine why anyone would
199. Epstein, supra note 27, at 2119.
200. Funk, supra note 196, at 364, 367.
201. Epstein, supra note 27, at 2152.
202. Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 673 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice
Kennedy is not advocating that the Pledge of Allegiance be struck down as a violation of the
Establishment Clause; on the contrary, he uses this example to illustrate why the endorsement
test suggested by Justice O'Connor is objectionable. He argues that "[i]f the endorsement test,
applied without artificial exceptions for historical practice, reached results consistent with
history, my objections to it would have less force. But, as I understand that test, the
touchstone of an Establishment Clause violation is whether nonadherents would be made to
feel like 'outsiders' by government recognition or accommodation of religion. Few of our
traditional practices recognizing the part religion plays in our society can withstand scrutiny
under a faithful application of this formula." Id. at 672-73.
MARGINS
No FREEDOM FROM RELIGION
waste time, effort, and money challenging them in court. But in
addition to creating a social, political, and legal atmosphere that is
hostile to nonbelievers, these practices often serve to justify other
violations of separation of church and state. Thus, the courts' refusal
to subject certain longstanding, traditional religious practices to
constitutional scrutiny opens the door for other intrusions from the
religion of the majority in public life. This reasoning process has been
203termed the "any more than" approach. Epstein argues that this
approach has "yielded an ever expanding sphere of activities courts
have found to be permissible." 20 4 The "any more than" approach has
been used to validate government-sponsored nativity displays and
prayers at graduation ceremonies.
In Lynch v. Donnelly, the Supreme Court upheld the city of
Pawtucket's holiday display, which included a creche, in its downtown
shopping area. The Court noted that the Constitution does not "require
complete separation of church and state; it affirmatively mandates
accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids
hostility towards any."20 5 The Court then detailed the many ways that
the government has recognized religion, citing the national motto, the
Pledge of Allegiance, and the National Day of Prayer. 0 6 The Court
then concluded that "whatever benefit [the creche provides] to one
faith or religion or to all religions is indirect, remote, and incidental;
display of the creche is no more an advancement or endorsement of
religion than the Congressional and Executive recognition of the
origins of the holiday itself as 'Christ's Mass,' or the exhibition of
literally hundreds of religious paintings in governmentally supported
museums."
207
203. Epstein, supra note 27, at 2087.
204. Id. at 2088.
205. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984).
206. Id. at 674-78.
207. Id. at 683. This argument about religious paintings in museums struck me as
extraordinarily strange, and yet I was surprised to find no scholarly commentary addressing it.
The analogy simply does not work; it seems bizarre to contend that by displaying works of art
in a museum, the government is accommodating any particular religious view. Museums
typically display art from a wide variety of religious perspectives. For instance, the National
Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C., displays Raphael's Alba Madonna, a portrait of the
Biblical Mary, infant Jesus, and a young John the Baptist; Giovanni Bellini's The Feast of the
Gods, which depicts the gods Jupiter, Neptune, and Apollo eating and drinking in the woods,
attended by nymphs and satyrs; and Benjamin West's The Expulsion of Adam and Eve From
Paradise, which shows a grief-stricken Adam and Eve being forced out of the Garden of
Paradise by an angry-looking archangel. Thus, there seems to be no particular religious view
endorsed by the government display of these paintings. Indeed, it seems quite clear that the
works are displayed for their artistic merit, rather than for the religious perspective they
represent. This is quite different from a city government setting up and maintaining a
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Clearly, the creche is not an example of ceremonial deism. But
by using examples of ceremonial deism to paint a picture of a
government that "accommodates" religion, coupled with a few other
examples of accommodation (such as museum paintings), the Court
justified what the four dissenting Justices in Lynch call an
"impermissible governmental endorsement of a particular faith. 2 °8
Writing for the dissent, Justice Brennan noted that the effect of the
creche "on minority groups, as well as on those who may reject all
religion, is to convey the message that their views are not similarly
worthy of public recognition nor entitled to public support. 2 °9
Another example of when the "any more test" was used by the
Court is Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District.2 10 In
Jones, graduating seniors and parents challenged "Clear Creek's
policy and actions permitting invocations consisting of traditional
Christian prayer at high school graduation ceremonies" as violating the
Establishment Clause. 2 1  The court used the Lemon test to evaluate
the school's policy, but it succumbed to the "any more than" approach
when it reached the "effect" prong of the Lemon test:
Constitutional examples of governmental religious
accommodation abound. Nebraska may pay a
Protestant chaplain to open its legislature's daily
sessions with an invocation. Our statutorily prescribed
national motto is "In God We Trust." The Pledge of
Allegiance, recited daily by thousands of public school
children, describes us as "One nation under God." We
even begin each public hearing in federal court with the
invocation "God save the United States and this
Honorable Court." ... All of the students will have
seen United States currency, and many will have
witnessed judicial or legislative proceedings.... The
Resolution no more advances or endorses religion than
Christian holiday display on government property, where only a single religious perspective is
represented and the primary function of the display is depicting the religious view, rather than
an artistic effort.
208. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 695 (1984).
209. Id. at 701.
210. Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District, 930 F.2d 416, 417 (5th Cir.
1991).
211. Id.
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the myriad of constitutional public religious
accommodations cited above.. 212
The 5th Circuit used practices that have never been properly
scrutinized under the Lemon test by the Supreme Court-because the
practices are mere "ceremonial deism"--to assert that the practice at
hand passes the second prong of the Lemon test. Thus the court
concluded that prayer at graduation does not violate the Establishment
Clause.
These examples show that because practices deemed
ceremonial deism by the Supreme Court can be used to justify other
government accommodations of religion, nonbelievers and other
members of religious minorities must continue to challenge all
violations of the Establishment Clause, no matter how trivial they may
seem to be.
IV. CONCLUSION
American atheists are undoubtedly accustomed to living in a
society saturated with theistic religious practices. After all, a
tremendous majority of Americans believe in God. Because theists are
clearly the dominant group in American society, they wield significant
cultural power. The theist perspective thus runs through our social,
political, and legal institutions, and is presumed to be universal by the
dominant majority. For nonbelievers, this constant imposition of the
theist perspective is both alienating and marginalizing. The
universalization of the theist perspective alienates atheists by making
them feel uncomfortable and unwelcome in their own country. It also
marginalizes atheists by denying them the opportunity to participate
fully in their social, political, and legal communities.
The alienation and marginalization of nonbelievers in the
United States is the result of this universalization of theism, a form of
cultural imperialism, which theists impose upon nonbelievers. Theists
utilize a wide variety of mechanisms to impose theism on
nonbelievers. These mechanisms include advocating school prayer
and religious character education programs, excluding atheists from
popular social organizations that purport to be inclusive, equating
morality with theistic belief, punishing atheists who speak out, and
212. Id. at 421-22.
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allowing unconstitutional governmental endorsement of theism by
casting it as "ceremonial deism." Until theists recognize that the
imposition of their own religious perspective on American society
oppresses the small minority of nonbelievers, atheists will likely
continue to experience alienation and marginalization.
